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On the Allocative Efficiency of Ownership Unbundling

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  • Bolle, Friedel
  • Breitmoser, Yves

Abstract

We analyze vertical structures where a regulated network operator serves n network users, and the network users compete in quantities for customers. We distinguish two cases: (i) none of the network users are related to the network operator (ownership unbundling), (ii) one of the network users is partially integrated with the operator and the others are disintegrated (legal unbundling). We seek to understand when ownership unbundling leads to lower customer prices, and formalize necessary conditions. In general, legal unbundling implies a less effective regulation, but it reduces the degree of market distortion caused by the difference between marginal costs and average costs (= regulated prices of network usage). We find that the necessary condition is not satisfied for realistic values of the relevant parameters, i.e. legal unbundling leads to lower costumer prices than ownership unbundling in most relevant markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Bolle, Friedel & Breitmoser, Yves, 2006. "On the Allocative Efficiency of Ownership Unbundling," Discussion Papers 255, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:euvwdp:255
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Crémer, Jacques & Cremer, Helmuth & De Donder, Philippe, 2006. "Legal vs Ownership Unbundling in Network Industries," CEPR Discussion Papers 5767, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. van Koten, S. & Ortmann, A., 2008. "The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: A case of legislative and regulatory capture?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 3128-3140, November.
    3. Joseph J. Spengler, 1950. "Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 347-347.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cremer Helmuth & De Donder Philippe, 2013. "Network Investment under Legal and Ownership Unbundling," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 27-59, March.
    2. Paul Nillesen & Michael Pollitt, 2011. "Ownership Unbundling in Electricity Distribution: Empirical Evidence from New Zealand," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 38(1), pages 61-93, January.
    3. Elena Argentesi & Albert Banal-Estanol & Jo Seldeslachts & Meagan Andrews, 2017. "A Retrospective Evaluation of the GDF/Suez Merger: Effects on Gas Hub Prices," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1664, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    4. Fabian Queder, 2020. "Towards a vertically separated broadband infrastructure: The potential role of voluntary separation," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, , vol. 21(2), pages 143-165, June.
    5. Pollitt, Michael, 2008. "The arguments for and against ownership unbundling of energy transmission networks," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 704-713, February.
    6. Yunus Emre Gürler & Sinan Ertemel & Matthias Finger & Muzaffer Eroğlu, 2024. "Legal and ownership unbundling in the Turkish natural gas market: A comparative analysis," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, , vol. 25(1), pages 19-42, March.
    7. Lindemann, Henrik, 2015. "Regulatory Objectives and the Intensity of Unbundling in Electricity Markets," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-544, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    8. Anette Boom, 2012. "Vertikale Entflechtung in der Stromwirtschaft," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 81(1), pages 57-71.
    9. Growitsch, Christian & Müller, Gernot & Stronzik, Marcus, 2008. "Ownership Unbundling in der Gaswirtschaft: Theoretische Grundlagen und empirische Evidenz," WIK Discussion Papers 308, WIK Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste GmbH.
    10. Suleman, Shafic, 2020. "Natural Gas Industry Restructuring for Value Optimisation: A Case Study of Ghana," MPRA Paper 99155, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Gugler, Klaus & Rammerstorfer, Margarethe & Schmitt, Stephan, 2013. "Ownership unbundling and investment in electricity markets — A cross country study," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 702-713.
    12. Nikogosian, Vigen & Veith, Tobias, 2011. "Vertical integration, separation and non-price discrimination: An empirical analysis of German electricity markets for residential customers," ZEW Discussion Papers 11-069, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unbundling; vertical integration; Cournot competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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