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The dynamics of venture capital contracts

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  • Bienz, Carsten
  • Hirsch, Julia

Abstract

We analyze the degree of contract completeness with respect to staging of venture capital investments using a hand-collected German data set of contract data from 464 rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish three forms of staging (pure milestone financing, pure round financing and mixes). Thereby, contract completeness reduces when going from pure milestone financing via mixes to pure round financing. We show that the decision for a specific form of staging is determined by the expected distribution of bargaining power between the contracting parties when new funding becomes necessary and the predictability of the development process. To be more precise, parties choose the more complete contracts the lower the entrepreneur's expected bargaining power - the maximum level depending on the predictability of the development process.

Suggested Citation

  • Bienz, Carsten & Hirsch, Julia, 2005. "The dynamics of venture capital contracts," CFS Working Paper Series 2006/11, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cfswop:200611
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    Cited by:

    1. Dahiya, Sandeep & Ray, Korok, 2012. "Staged investments in entrepreneurial financing," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 1193-1216.
    2. Rafał Morawczyński, 2020. "Venture Capitalists’ Investment Criteria in Poland: Entrepreneurial Opportunities, Entrepreneurs, and Founding Teams," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-30, October.
    3. Carsten Bienz & Uwe Walz, 2010. "Venture Capital Exit Rights," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(4), pages 1071-1116, December.
    4. Hirsch, Julia & Walz, Uwe, 2006. "Why do contracts differ between VC types? Market segmentation versus corporate governance varieties," CFS Working Paper Series 2006/12, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    5. Dirk Bergemann & Ulrich Hege & Liang Peng, 2008. "Venture Capital and Sequential Investments," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1682R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2009.
    6. Suting Hong & Konstantinos Serfes & Veikko Thiele, 2020. "Competition in the venture capital market and the success of startup companies: Theory and evidence," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 741-791, October.
    7. Jens Burchardt & Ulrich Hommel & Dzidziso Samuel Kamuriwo & Carolina Billitteri, 2016. "Venture Capital Contracting in Theory and Practice: Implications for Entrepreneurship Research," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 40(1), pages 25-48, January.
    8. Kirill Shakhnov, 2022. "The Allocation of Talent: Finance versus Entrepreneurship," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 46, pages 161-195, October.
    9. Rin, Marco Da & Hellmann, Thomas & Puri, Manju, 2013. "A Survey of Venture Capital Research," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 573-648, Elsevier.
    10. Julia Hirsch & Uwe Walz, 2013. "Why do contracts differ between venture capital types?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 511-525, April.
    11. Hertzel, Michael G. & Huson, Mark R. & Parrino, Robert, 2012. "Public market staging: The timing of capital infusions in newly public firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 72-90.
    12. Uwe Walz & Carsten Bienz, 2006. "Evolution of Decision and Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," FMG Discussion Papers dp585, Financial Markets Group.
    13. Soenke Sievers & Christopher F. Mokwa & Georg Keienburg, 2012. "The Relevance of Financial versus Non-Financial Information for the Valuation of Venture Capital-Backed Firms," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(3), pages 467-511, September.
    14. Christian Hopp, 2007. "Nothing Ventured - Nothing Gained? Empirical Evidence on Venture Capital Financing in Switzerland," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 143(III), pages 239-260, September.
    15. Schwienbacher, Armin, 2013. "The entrepreneur's investor choice: The impact on later-stage firm development," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 528-545.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Venture Capital; Corporate Governance; Moral Hazard; Renegotiation; Contract Theory; Empirical Contract Theory; Contract Econometrics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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