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Creditor concentration: an empirical investigation

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  • Ongena, Steven
  • Tümer-Alkan, Günseli
  • von Westernhagen, Natalja

Abstract

Most of the literature addressing multiple banking assumes equal financing shares. However, unequal, concentrated or asymmetric bank borrowing is widespread. This paper investigates the determinants of creditor concentration for German firms using a comprehensive bank-firm level dataset for the time period between 1993 and 2003. We document that lending is very often concentrated and, consequently, that relationship lending is important, not only for the small firms but also for the larger firms in our sample. However, we also find that risky, illiquid, large and leveraged firms spread their borrowing more evenly between multiple lenders. On the other hand, the degree of concentration increases with the profitability of the relationship lender. Relationship lending may spur financing provided by other banks, especially if the relationship lender is a public sector bank and if the other banks are large or do not have to tie up additional funds in capital.

Suggested Citation

  • Ongena, Steven & Tümer-Alkan, Günseli & von Westernhagen, Natalja, 2007. "Creditor concentration: an empirical investigation," Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 2007,15, Deutsche Bundesbank.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdp2:6927
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bank relationships; asymmetric financing; banking competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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