Why do bank runs look like panic? A new explanation
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000.
"Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity,"
Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
- Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-419, June.
- Chari, V V & Jagannathan, Ravi, 1988. " Banking Panics, Information, and Rational Expectations Equilibrium," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 749-761, July.
- Chen, Yehning & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2006. "The transparency of the banking system and the efficiency of information-based bank runs," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 307-331, July.
- Calomiris, Charles W., 1990. "Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 283-295, June.
- Hasan, Iftekhar & Dwyer, Gerald P, Jr, 1994. "Bank Runs in the Free Banking Period," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(2), pages 271-288, May.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- repec:zbw:bofrdp:2006_019 is not listed on IDEAS
- Yehning Chen & Iftekhar Hasan, 2008.
"Why Do Bank Runs Look Like Panic? A New Explanation,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(2‐3), pages 535-546, March.
- Yehning Chen & Iftekhar Hasan, 2008. "Why Do Bank Runs Look Like Panic? A New Explanation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(2-3), pages 535-546, March.
- Yehning Chen & Iftekhar Hasan, 2008.
"Why Do Bank Runs Look Like Panic? A New Explanation,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(2-3), pages 535-546, March.
- Yehning Chen & Iftekhar Hasan, 2008. "Why Do Bank Runs Look Like Panic? A New Explanation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(2‐3), pages 535-546, March.
- Chen, Yehning & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2006. "Why do bank runs look like panic? : a new explanation," Research Discussion Papers 19/2006, Bank of Finland.
- Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2010. "Liquidity, Bank Runs, and Bailouts: Spillover Effects During the Northern Rock Episode," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 37(2), pages 83-98, June.
- Qian, Meijun & Tanyeri, Başak, 2017. "Litigation and mutual-fund runs," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 119-135.
- Acharya, Viral & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2003. "Information Contagion and Inter-Bank Correlation in a Theory of Systemic Risk," CEPR Discussion Papers 3743, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Semenova, M., 2011. "Bank Runs and Costly Information," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 10, pages 31-52.
- Dwyer Jr., Gerald P. & Samartín, Margarita, 2009.
"Why do banks promise to pay par on demand?,"
Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-169, June.
- Margarita SamartÃn & Gerald Dwyer, 2004. "Why do banks promise to pay par on demand?," 2004 Meeting Papers 372, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Gerald P. Dwyer & Margarita Samartin, 2006. "Why do banks promise to pay par on demand?," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Margarita Samartin & Gerald Dwyer, 2004. "Why do Banks Promise to Pay Par on Demand?," 2004 Meeting Papers 180c, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Miller, V., 1998. "Domestic bank runs and speculative attacks on foreign currencies," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 331-338, April.
- International Association of Deposit Insurers, 2020. "Evaluation of Differential Premium Systems for Deposit Insurance," IADI Research Papers 20-06, International Association of Deposit Insurers.
- Harold Ngalawa & Fulbert Tchana Tchana & Nicola Viegi, 2016.
"Banking instability and deposit insurance: The role of moral hazard,"
Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 19, pages 323-350, November.
- Harold Ngalawa & Fulbert Tchana Tchana & Nicola Viegi, 2016. "Banking Instability and Deposit Insurance: The Role of Moral Hazard," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(2), pages 323-350, November.
- Ngalawa, Harold & Tchana Tchana, Fulbert & Viegi, Nicola, 2011. "Banking Instability and Deposit Insurance: The Role of Moral Hazard," MPRA Paper 31329, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Goldstein, Itay & Razin, Assaf, 2015.
"Three Branches of Theories of Financial Crises,"
Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 10(2), pages 113-180, 30.
- Itay Goldstein & Assaf Razin, 2013. "Three Branches of Theories of Financial Crises," NBER Working Papers 18670, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, 1991.
"The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation,"
NBER Chapters, in: Financial Markets and Financial Crises, pages 109-174,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, "undated". "The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 11-90, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena & Goldstein, Itay & Leonello, Agnese, 2018.
"Government guarantees and financial stability,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 518-557.
- Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena & Goldstein, Itay & Leonello, Agnese, 2015. "Government Guarantees and Financial Stability," CEPR Discussion Papers 10560, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Carletti, Elena & Leonello, Agnese & Allen, Franklin & Goldstein, Itay, 2017. "Government guarantees and financial stability," Working Paper Series 2032, European Central Bank.
- Chen, Yi & Du, Kai, 2020. "The role of information disclosure in financial intermediation with investment risk," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 46(C).
- Committee, Nobel Prize, 2022. "Financial Intermediation and the Economy," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2022-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
- De Bandt, Olivier & Hartmann, Philipp, 2000.
"Systemic risk: A survey,"
Working Paper Series
35, European Central Bank.
- de Bandt, Olivier & Hartmann, Philipp, 2000. "Systemic Risk: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 2634, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bougheas, Spiros, 1999. "Contagious bank runs," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 131-146, June.
- Ratnovski, Lev, 2013.
"Liquidity and transparency in bank risk management,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 422-439.
- Mr. Lev Ratnovski, 2013. "Liquidity and Transparency in Bank Risk Management," IMF Working Papers 2013/016, International Monetary Fund.
- Parnes, Dror, 2021. "Modeling the contagion of bank runs with a Markov model," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 174-187.
- repec:zbw:bofrdp:2004_010 is not listed on IDEAS
- Goedde-Menke, Michael & Langer, Thomas & Pfingsten, Andreas, 2014. "Impact of the financial crisis on bank run risk – Danger of the days after," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 522-533.
More about this item
Keywords
bank run; banking panic; suspension of convertibility;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:bofrdp:rdp2006_019. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bofgvfi.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.