Loss Aversion, Presidential Responsibility, and Midterm Congressional Elections
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Loss aversion; midterm elections; congressional elections; negative voting; midterm effect;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H - Public Economics
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-POL-2005-04-16 (Positive Political Economics)
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