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The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment

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  • RAGHURAM RAJAN
  • HENRY SERVAES
  • LUIGI ZINGALES

Abstract

In a simple model of capital budgeting in a diversified firm where headquarters have limited power, we show that funds are allocated towards the most inefficient divisions. The distortion is greater, when the investment oppotunities of the firm’s divisions are more diverse. We test these implications on a panel of diversified firms in the United States during the period 1979–93. We find that i) diversified firms mis-allocate investment funds; ii) the extent of mis-allocation is positively related to the diversity of investment opportunities across divisions; and iii) the discount, at which these diversified firms trade, is positively related to the extent of the investment mis-allocation and to the diversity of investment opportunities across divisions.
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  • Raghuram Rajan & Henry Servaes & Luigi Zingales, "undated". "The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment," CRSP working papers 463, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    • Handle: RePEc:wop:chispw:463
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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