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Monitoring by Peers or by Delegates? Joint Liability Loans under Moral Hazard

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the conditions under which joint liability loans to encourage peer-monitoring would be offered and chosen ahead of monitored individual liability alternatives on a competitive loan market when production and monitoring activities are subject to moral hazard. In contrast to other analyses, the case for joint liability loans does not rest on an assumed monitoring or information advantage by borrowers but instead relies on a incentive diversification effect that cannot be replicated by outside intermediaries. Joint liability clauses are chosen to implement a preferred Nash equilibrium in a multi-agent, multi-tasking game, where borrowers must be given incentives to be diligent as financed entrepreneurs and as monitors of others. Potential side contracting or collusion amongst borrowers is shown to only harm credit access, even when borrowers enjoy a monitoring advantage relative to outsiders.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Conning, 2000. "Monitoring by Peers or by Delegates? Joint Liability Loans under Moral Hazard," Department of Economics Working Papers 2000-07, Department of Economics, Williams College.
    • Handle: RePEc:wil:wileco:2000-07
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    File URL: https://web.williams.edu/Economics/wp/jliability.pdf
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    1. Ashok S. Rai & Tomas Sjostrom, "undated". "Is Grameen Lending Efficient?," CID Working Papers 40, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rafael Gomez & Eric Santor, 2003. "Do Peer Group Members Outperform Individual Borrowers? A Test of Peer Group Lending Using Canadian Micro-Credit Data," Staff Working Papers 03-33, Bank of Canada.
    2. Francis Kramarz & Oskar Nordström Skans, 2014. "When Strong Ties are Strong: Networks and Youth Labour Market Entry," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(3), pages 1164-1200.
    3. Li, Shanjun & Liu, Yanyan & Deininger, Klaus W., 2009. "How Important are Peer Effects in Group Lending? Estimating a Static Game of Incomplete Information," 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 49497, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    4. repec:dgr:rugsom:03e36 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Simtowe, Franklin & Zeller, Manfred, 2006. "Determinants of Moral Hazard in Microfinance: Empirical Evidence from Joint Liability Lending Programs in Malawi," MPRA Paper 461, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Kundu, AMIT & MITRA, SURANJANA, 2009. "Determinants Influencing a Rural Household's Preference to Join Individual Liability or Joint Liability Micro Credit Contract Operated by Primary Aagricultural Credit Society," MPRA Paper 21784, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Oct 2009.
    7. Jonathan Conning & Michael Kevane, 2002. "Why Isn't There More Financial Intermediation in Developing Countries?," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2002-28, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    8. Kumar Aniket, 2007. "Does Subsidising the Cost of Capital Help the Poorest? An Analysis of Saving Opportunities in Group Lending," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 140, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    9. Hoque, Md Mahfuzul & Kummer, Tyge-F. & Yigitbasioglu, Ogan, 2024. "How can blockchain-based lending platforms support microcredit activities in developing countries? An empirical validation of its opportunities and challenges," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    10. Paal, Beatrix & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 30-40, January.
    11. Hermes, Niels & Lensink, Robert & Mehrteab, Habteab T., 2005. "Peer Monitoring, Social Ties and Moral Hazard in Group Lending Programs: Evidence from Eritrea," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 149-169, January.
    12. Leonardo Becchetti & Fabio Pisani, 2010. "Microfinance, subsidies and local externalities," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 309-321, April.
    13. Abdul Karim, Zulkefly, 2009. "Microfinance and Mechanism Design: The Role of Joint Liability and Cross-Reporting," MPRA Paper 23934, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 12 Jan 2010.
    14. Simtowe, Franklin & Zeller, Manfred & Phiri, Alexander, 2006. "Determinants of Moral hazard in Microfinance: Empirical Evidence from Joint Liability Lending Schemes in Malawi," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25287, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    15. Naveen Kumar K, 2012. "Dynamic Incentives in Microfinance Group Lending," SAGE Open, , vol. 2(2), pages 21582440124, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Joint-Liability; Group-Lending; Credit-Cooperatives; Financial-Intermediation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

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