Interest Groups, Veto Points And Electricity Infrastructure Deployment
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- Henisz, Witold J. & Zelner, Bennet A., 2006. "Interest Groups, Veto Points, and Electricity Infrastructure Deployment," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 263-286, January.
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More about this item
Keywords
Electricity; Institutional Environment; Investment; Regulation; interest group; state owned enterprise;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
- F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2005-03-20 (Business Economics)
- NEP-ENE-2005-03-20 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-POL-2005-03-20 (Positive Political Economics)
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