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Does greater accountability improve the quality of delivery of public services? Evidence from Uganda

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  • Deininger, Klaus
  • Mpuga, Paul

Abstract

While the importance of corruption as a possible impediment to foreign investment in an international context is now well realized, it is not clear to what extent corruption affects, either directly through bribe-taking or indirectly through inadequate quality of public services, the level of economic activity by domestic entrepreneurs. Using a large survey from Uganda, the authors show that domestic and foreign entrepreneurs, government officials, and households are unanimous in highlighting the pervasiveness and importance of corruption. Efforts to establish institutions to deal with corrupt practices have not been matched by public education on the proper procedures. The fact that such lack of knowledge on procedures to report corruption increases households'risk of being subject to bribery and significantly reduces the quality of public service delivery leads the authors to conclude that improved accountability will be important to reduce the incidence of corruption and improve delivery of public services.

Suggested Citation

  • Deininger, Klaus & Mpuga, Paul, 2004. "Does greater accountability improve the quality of delivery of public services? Evidence from Uganda," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3277, The World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3277
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hunt, Jennifer & Laszlo, Sonia, 2005. "Bribery: Who Pays, Who Refuses, What are the Payoffs?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5251, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Straub, Stéphane & Flochel, Thomas, 2016. "Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 395-407.
    3. Assefa Bequele & Yehualashet Mekonen, 2018. "Accountability to Africa’s Children: How Far Have We Come and What Can We Do About It?," Child Indicators Research, Springer;The International Society of Child Indicators (ISCI), vol. 11(2), pages 355-382, April.
    4. Nathan Fiala & Patrick Premand, 2018. "Social Accountability and Service Delivery: Experimental Evidence from Uganda," Working papers 2018-04, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    5. Hunt, Jennifer & Laszlo, Sonia, 2012. "Is Bribery Really Regressive? Bribery’s Costs, Benefits, and Mechanisms," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 355-372.
    6. Siham MATALLAH & Lahouari BENLAHCENE, 2021. "Public service delivery dilemma and economic growth challenges in the MENA Region," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania / Editura Economica, vol. 0(4(629), W), pages 31-50, Winter.

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