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Estimating the Impact of Experience Rating on the Inflow into Disability Insurance in the Netherlands

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  • P. Koning

Abstract

This paper examines the effects of experience rating on the inflow into disability insurance (DI) in the Netherlands, using unique longitudinal administrative data from the social benefitadministration. We follow a difference-in-differences approach to identify the impact of changes in DI premiums. Due to unawareness of the experience rating system, employers seem to have been triggered to increase preventative activities, once they have experienced increases in DI premium. We find this impact to be substantial, amounting to a 15% reduction of the DI inflow.

Suggested Citation

  • P. Koning, 2005. "Estimating the Impact of Experience Rating on the Inflow into Disability Insurance in the Netherlands," Working Papers 05-07, Utrecht School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:use:tkiwps:0507
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Topel, Robert H, 1983. "On Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 541-559, September.
    2. Hassink, R. & van Ours, J.C. & Ridder, G., 1997. "Dismissal through disability," Other publications TiSEM b756763d-1536-4d61-84e4-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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    8. Bruce, Christopher J & Atkins, Frank J, 1993. "Efficiency Effects of Premium-Setting Regimes under Workers' Compensation: Canada and the United States," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(1), pages 38-69, January.
    9. Patricia M. Anderson & Bruce D. Meyer, 1994. "The Effects of Unemployment Insurance Taxes and Benefits on Layoffs Using Firm and Individual Data," NBER Working Papers 4960, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Koning & Daniel van Vuuren, 2006. "Hidden unemployment in disability insurance in the Netherlands; an empirical analysis based on employer data," CPB Discussion Paper 69, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    2. Anja Deelen, 2005. "Adverse selection in disability insurance; empirical evidence for Dutch firms," CPB Discussion Paper 46, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    3. Stijn Baert & Bas van der Klaauw & Gijsbert van Lomwel, 2018. "The effectiveness of medical and vocational interventions for reducing sick leave of self‐employed workers," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(2), pages 139-152, February.
    4. Vikström, Johan, 2009. "The effect of employer incentives in social insurance on individual wages," Working Paper Series 2009:13, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    5. Annemiek Vuren & Daniel Vuuren, 2007. "Financial Incentives in Disability Insurance in the Netherlands," De Economist, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 73-98, March.
    6. Alois Guger & Thomas Leoni, 2006. "Teilstudie 15: Arbeitsmarktflexibilität und soziale Absicherung," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 27454.
    7. Christl, Michael & Kucsera, Dénes & Lorenz, Hanno, 2015. "Jung, älter, arbeitslos? Wie Ältere länger in Beschäftigung gehalten werden können, ohne die Jungen in die Arbeitslosigkeit zu treiben," EconStor Research Reports 119605, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    8. Annemiek Vuren & Daniel Vuuren, 2007. "Financial Incentives in Disability Insurance in the Netherlands," De Economist, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 73-98, March.
    9. Alois Guger, 2007. "WIFO-Weißbuch: Arbeitsmarktflexibilität und soziale Absicherung," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 80(5), pages 469-481, May.
    10. Christine Mayrhuber & Silvia Rocha-Akis, 2013. "Anreizsysteme zur Weiterbeschäftigung älterer Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 46905.
    11. Pierre Koning & Daniel Van Vuuren, 2007. "Hidden Unemployment in Disability Insurance," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 21(4‐5), pages 611-636, December.
    12. T. Everhardt & Ph. Jong, 2011. "Return to Work After Long Term Sickness," De Economist, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 361-380, September.
    13. Ulrike Famira-Mühlberger & Ulrike Huemer & Christine Mayrhuber, 2015. "Die Beschäftigungsquote Älterer im europäischen Vergleich," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 58532.
    14. Anja Deelen, 2005. "Adverse selection in disability insurance; empirical evidence for Dutch firms," CPB Discussion Paper 46.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    15. Gautier, Pieter A. & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2009. "Institutions and labor market outcomes in the Netherlands," Working Paper Series 2009:28, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    experience rating; disability insurance; panel data;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models

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