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Interlocking directorates in Spanish banking in the twentieth century

Author

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  • Francisco J. Pueyo

Abstract

Spanish banking historiography asserts that the largest banks performed in the twentieth century as though they constituted a monopoly. One of their main coordination schemes would have been a network of interlocking bank directors that would include most of the financial firms. Evidence available for the 1920s and 1960s seems to confirm the veracity of this hypothesis. In this paper, more systematic evidence is presented to cover the whole twentieth century with the aim of checking whether these networks persisted over the entire period or they were by-products of temporary situations. Our results show that no general network remained for more than a decade. Therefore, it should be ruled out that interlocking directorates worked as a coordination device of an alleged banking cartel.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco J. Pueyo, 2006. "Interlocking directorates in Spanish banking in the twentieth century," Economics Working Papers 931, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:931
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. B. Tomka, 2001. "Interlocking Directorates of Banks and Industrial Companies in Hungary at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(1), pages 25-42.
    2. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 7-26.
    3. Caroline Fohlin, 1999. "The rise of interlocking directorates in imperial Germany," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 52(2), pages 307-333, May.
    4. Ruiz, José Luis García, 2002. "Los arreglos interbancarios durante el franquismo," Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(2), pages 365-386, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Juan Antonio Rubio Mondéjar & Josean Garrués Irurzun, 2012. "Estructura corporativa e interlocking directorates en las mayores empresas españolas, 1917-1970," FEG Working Paper Series 01/12, Faculty of Economics and Business (University of Granada).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monopolization strategies; Interlocking directorates; Spanish banking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • N24 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: 1913-

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