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Social rationalizability

Author

Listed:
  • Herings, P.J.J.

    (Microeconomics & Public Economics)

  • Mauleon, A.

    (Externe publicaties SBE)

  • Vannetelbosch, V.

    (Externe publicaties SBE)

Abstract

Social environments constitute a framework in which it is possible to study how groups of agents interact in a society. The framework is general enough to analyse both non-cooperative and cooperative games. We identify a number of shortcomings of existing solution concepts that are used for social environments and propose a new concept called social rationalizability. The concept aims to identify the consequences of common knowledge of rationality and farsightedness within the framework of social environments. The set of socially rationalizable outcomes is shown to be non-empty for all social environments and it can be computed by an iterative reduction procedure. We introduce a definition of coalitional rationality for social environments and show that it is satisfied by social rationalizability.
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Suggested Citation

  • Herings, P.J.J. & Mauleon, A. & Vannetelbosch, V., 2000. "Social rationalizability," Research Memorandum 017, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2000017
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2000017
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2023. "Social Rationalizability with Mediation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 440-461, June.
    2. Fernando M. M. Ruiz, 2006. "Convergence de l'impôt sur les sociétés dans l'Union E uropéenne," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(2), pages 79-96.
    3. Jan Svitlík, 2015. "ETR Development and Analysis: Case from the Czech Republic," European Financial and Accounting Journal, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2015(4), pages 5-18.
    4. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 2004. "Rationalizability for social environments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 135-156, October.
    5. Anindya Bhattacharya & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2012. "On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 537-552, July.
    6. BHATTACHARYA, Anindya & ZIAD, Abderrahmane, 2003. "On conservative stable standard of behaviour in situations with perfect foresight," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003049, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    7. Salvatore, Dominick, 2002. "Relative taxation and competitiveness in the European Union: what the European Union can learn from the United States," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 401-410, July.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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