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The economic consequences of Mr. G.W. Bush's foreign policy. can the us afford it?

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  • Roberto Tamborini

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  • Roberto Tamborini, 2004. "The economic consequences of Mr. G.W. Bush's foreign policy. can the us afford it?," Department of Economics Working Papers 0402, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    • Handle: RePEc:trn:utwpde:0402
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Johnson, Harry G, 1976. "Notes on the Classical Transfer Problem," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, vol. 44(3), pages 211-219, September.
    2. repec:bla:econom:v:42:y:1975:i:165:p:20-31 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Credibility and politics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 542-550, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Flora Bellone & Patrick Musso & Lionel Nesta & Stefano Schiavo, 2010. "Financial Constraints and Firm Export Behaviour," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 347-373, March.
    2. Gianluca Grimalda & Lorenzo Sacconi, 2005. "The Constitution of the Not-For-Profit Organisation: Reciprocal Conformity to Morality," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 249-276, September.
    3. Julie Dana & Christopher L. Gilbert, 2008. "Managing Agricultural Price Risk in Developing Countries," Department of Economics Working Papers 0819, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    4. Lorenzo Sacconi & Stefano Moretti, 2004. "A Fuzzy Logic and Default Reasoning Model of Social Norm and Equilibrium Selection in Games under Unforeseen Contingencies," Department of Economics Working Papers 0412, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    5. Andreozzi, Luciano, 2012. "Property rights and investments: An evolutionary approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 1-11.
    6. Giuseppe Arbia & Giuseppe Espa & Diego Giuliani & Andrea Mazzitelli, 2009. "Clusters of firms in space and time," Department of Economics Working Papers 0902, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    7. Christopher L. Gilbert, 2008. "How to Understand High Food Prices," Department of Economics Working Papers 0823, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    8. Elisabetta De Antoni, 2008. "Minsky�s Upward Instability: the Not-Too-Keynesian Optimism of a Financial Cassandra," Department of Economics Working Papers 0812, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    9. Christopher L. Gilbert, 2008. "Commodity Speculation and Commodity Investment," Department of Economics Working Papers 0820, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    10. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2004. "A Social Contract Account for CSR as Extended Model of Corporate Governance (Part II): Compliance, Reputation and Reciprocity," Department of Economics Working Papers 0411, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    11. Sandra Notaro & Alessandro Paletto & Roberta Raffaelli, 2008. "Does forest damage have an economic impact? A case study from the Italian Alps," Department of Economics Working Papers 0809, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    12. K. Vela Velupillai, 2004. "The unreasonable ineffectiveness of mathematics in economics," Department of Economics Working Papers 0406, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    13. Christopher L. Gilbert & Alexandra Tabova, 2004. "Commodity prices and debt sustainability," Department of Economics Working Papers 0404, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.

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