On Uneven Expected Earnings in the Lab
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Cited by:
- Voslinsky, Alisa & Azar, Ofer H., 2021. "Incentives in experimental economics," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
uneven expected lab earnings; social preferences; preferences;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBE-2014-03-22 (Cognitive and Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2014-03-22 (Experimental Economics)
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