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Interbank credit exposures and financial stability

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  • Schneorson, Oren

Abstract

This paper investigates how interbank credit exposures affect financial stability. Policy makers often see such exposures as undermining stability by exacerbating cascading losses through the financial system. I develop a model that features a trade-off between cascading losses and risk-sharing. In contrast to previous studies I find that reducing interbank connectivity may destabilize the financial system via the bank-run channel. This is because it decreases the risk-sharing benefits of interbank connectivity. A bank-run model features two islands that are connected via a long term debt claim. Varying the size of this claim (interbank connectivity), I study how the decision to `run on the bank' is affected. I run a simulation of the model, calibrated to the U.S. banking system between 1997-2007. I find that large bankruptcy costs are required to trump the risk-sharing benefits of interbank credit exposures. JEL Classification: G01, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

  • Schneorson, Oren, 2022. "Interbank credit exposures and financial stability," ESRB Working Paper Series 136, European Systemic Risk Board.
    • Handle: RePEc:srk:srkwps:2022136
    as

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    File URL: https://www.esrb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/wp/esrb.wp136~8fd9c22d44.en.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bank runs; credit risk; derivatives; financial stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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