Pareto-Improving Cheating In An Economic Policy Game
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Cited by:
- Dawid, Herbert & Deissenberg, Christophe, 2005.
"On the efficiency-effects of private (dis-)trust in the government,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 530-550, August.
- Herbert Dawid & Christophe Deissenberg, "undated". "On the Efficiency-Effects of Private (Dis-)Trust in the Government," Modeling, Computing, and Mastering Complexity 2003 25, Society for Computational Economics.
- Herbert Dawid & Christophe Deissenberg & Pavel Ševčik, 2005.
"Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game,"
Springer Books, in: Alain Haurie & Georges Zaccour (ed.), Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications, chapter 0, pages 175-192,
Springer.
- Christophe Deissenberg & Herbert Dawid & Pavel Sevcik, 2004. "Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game," Working Papers 2004.137, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
More about this item
Keywords
Macroeconomic policy-making; Barro-Gordon model; time inconsistency; reinforcement learning; reversed Stackelberg games; optimal cheating strategies; reputation; credibility.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
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