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Run Equilibria in a Model of Financial Intermediation

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  • Todd Keister

    (Research and Statistics Group, Federal Reserve Bank of New York)

  • Huberto M. Ennis

    (Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond)

Abstract

We study the Green and Lin (JET, 2003) model of financial intermediation with two new features: traders may face a cost of contacting the intermediary and consumption needs may be correlated across traders. We show that each of these features is capable of generating an equilibrium in which some (but not all) traders "run" on the intermediary by withdrawing their funds at the first opportunity regardless of their true consumption needs. Our results also provide some insight into the elements of the economic environment that are necessary for a run equilibrium to exist in general models of financial intermediation. In particular, they highlight the importance of information frictions that cause the intermediary and traders to have different beliefs, in equilibrium, about the consumption needs of those traders who have yet to contact the intermediary.

Suggested Citation

  • Todd Keister & Huberto M. Ennis, 2008. "Run Equilibria in a Model of Financial Intermediation," 2008 Meeting Papers 513, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed008:513
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Green, Edward J. & Lin, Ping, 2003. "Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 1-23, March.
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    6. Neil Wallace, 1988. "Another attempt to explain an illiquid banking system: the Diamond and Dybvig model with sequential service taken seriously," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 12(Fall), pages 3-16.
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    9. Andolfatto, David & Nosal, Ed & Wallace, Neil, 2007. "The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 709-715, November.
    10. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2007. "Commitment and equilibrium bank runs," Staff Reports 274, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    11. Edward J. Green & Ping Lin, 2000. "Diamond and Dybvig's classic theory of financial intermediation : what's missing?," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 3-13.
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    Cited by:

    1. Uhlig, Harald, 2010. "A model of a systemic bank run," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 78-96, January.
    2. Stephen D. Williamson & Randall Wright, 2010. "New monetarist economics: methods," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 92(May), pages 265-302.
    3. Williamson, Stephen & Wright, Randall, 2010. "New Monetarist Economics: Models," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 2, pages 25-96, Elsevier.
    4. Todd Keister & Huberto M. Ennis, 2007. "Commitment and Equilibrium Bank Runs," 2007 Meeting Papers 509, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2010. "On the fundamental reasons for bank fragility," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 96(1Q), pages 33-58.
    6. Uhlig, Harald, 2010. "A model of a systemic bank run," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 78-96, January.

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