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A supply-demand model of the size of public sector and Wagner's law

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  • Fedotenkov, Igor
  • Idrisov, Georgy

Abstract

In this paper, we develop a supply-demand model for the public sector, measured as governments' tax revenues divided by GDP. We use a political equilibrium with a rule of majority. The model takes into account inefficiencies caused by taxes and includes costs associated with public goods provision to consumers. We show that the size of the public sector depends on the median voter's income, size of population, costs associated with taxpaying, and quality of institutions, which reflect costs of public goods provision. The estimates for the OECD countries (2000-2017), using dynamic panel model techniques, are in line with the theoretical predictions; however, they do not confirm Wagner's law. Our estimates suggest that the size of the government sector grows as income increases, but at a slower rate. We show that the quality of institutions matters: a more effective government raises the share of public sector; better regulations, which permit and promote private sector development, reduce it.

Suggested Citation

  • Fedotenkov, Igor & Idrisov, Georgy, 2019. "A supply-demand model of the size of public sector and Wagner's law," MPRA Paper 94973, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:94973
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Size of public sector; tax burden; median voter; Wagner's law; political equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P43 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Finance; Public Finance
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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