IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/59836.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Information aggregation for timing decision making

Author

Listed:
  • Colla De-Robertis, Esteban

Abstract

In this paper I consider the issue of optimal information aggregation for timing decision making. In each period, a decision maker may choose an action which delivers an uncertain payoff, or wait until the next period, in when new information will arrive. The information is provided by a committee of experts. Each member in each period receives a signal correlated to the state. I obtain an optimal rule for aggregating information for each period.

Suggested Citation

  • Colla De-Robertis, Esteban, 2014. "Information aggregation for timing decision making," MPRA Paper 59836, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Nov 2014.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:59836
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59836/1/MPRA_paper_59836.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ben-Yashar, Ruth C & Nitzan, Shmuel I, 1997. "The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(1), pages 175-186, February.
    2. McLennan, Andrew, 1998. "Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(2), pages 413-418, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Eyal Baharad & Jacob Goldberger & Moshe Koppel & Shmuel Nitzan, 2012. "Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(1), pages 113-130, January.
    2. Alessandra Arcuri & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, 2010. "Centralization versus Decentralization as a Risk-Return Trade-Off," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(2), pages 359-378, May.
    3. Ruth Ben-Yashar, 2006. "Information is important to Condorcet jurors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 305-319, June.
    4. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Igal Milchtaich, 2003. "First and Second Best Voting Rules in Committees," Working Papers 2003-08, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    5. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Shmuel Nitzan, 2014. "On the significance of the prior of a correct decision in committees," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(3), pages 317-327, March.
    6. Gerling, Kerstin & Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2005. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 563-597, September.
    7. Bryan C. McCannon, 2015. "Condorcet jury theorems," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 9, pages 140-160, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Blume, Andreas & Franco, April Mitchell, 2007. "Decentralized learning from failure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 504-523, March.
    9. Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert & Addison Pan & Matthew Ryan, 2022. "A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 399-425, October.
    10. Andreas Blume & April Mitchell Franco & Paul Heidhues, 2021. "Dynamic coordination via organizational routines," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(4), pages 1001-1047, November.
    11. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2015. "Premise-based versus outcome-based information aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 34-42.
    12. Houy, Nicolas & Ménager, Lucie, 2008. "Communication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak first?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 140-152, November.
    13. Patrick Hummel, 2012. "Deliberation in large juries with diverse preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 595-608, March.
    14. Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2005. "Communication in Monetary Policy Committees," DNB Working Papers 059, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    15. Paolo Balduzzi & Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2014. "Voting in small committees," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 111(1), pages 69-95, February.
    16. Baharad, Eyal & Ben-Yashar, Ruth & Patal, Tal, 2020. "On the merit of non-specialization in the context of majority voting," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 128-133.
    17. Alessandra Casella & Thomas Palfrey & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Minorities and Storable Votes," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Raymond Riezman (ed.), International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 15, pages 247-282, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    18. Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir, 2012. "Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(1), pages 91-125, June.
    19. Gratton, Gabriele, 2014. "Pandering and electoral competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 163-179.
    20. Kohei Kawamura & Vasileios Vlaseros, 2013. "Expert Information and Majority Decisions," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 220, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information aggregation. Timing decision making. Experts.;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:59836. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.