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Military competition and size and composition of economy and government

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  • Teng, Jimmy

Abstract

This paper uses a formal model to analyze the effects of military competition between states on the size and composition of the economy and the government. Great economies of scale in warfare and even distributions of military capability among the contestants generate intense interstate rivalry, strong concern for relative economic and military capability. Consequently, there is a larger economy and government and an increasing share of the military in the economy. However, if there are diseconomies of scale in the provision of public intermediate inputs, intense military competition between states actually increases the relative size of the civilian public sector relative to that of the military. The paper then studies how waves of military technological revolutions affected military competition between states and the size and composition of economy and government in history.

Suggested Citation

  • Teng, Jimmy, 2012. "Military competition and size and composition of economy and government," MPRA Paper 37968, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Apr 2012.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:37968
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37968/1/MPRA_paper_37968.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Growth of Government; Public Intermediate Inputs; Civilianization; Economic Performance; Military Technological Revolutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative

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