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Корпоративное Управление И Эффективность Приватизированных Предприятий В России
[Corporate governance and the performance of privatized enterprises in Russia]

Author

Listed:
  • Muravyev, Alexander

Abstract

The paper considers key issues in the development of effective corporate governance in the newly established corporate sector of Russia.

Suggested Citation

  • Muravyev, Alexander, 1998. "Корпоративное Управление И Эффективность Приватизированных Предприятий В России [Corporate governance and the performance of privatized enterprises in Russia]," MPRA Paper 27275, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:27275
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27275/1/MPRA_paper_27275.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Frydman, Roman & Pistor, Katharina & Rapaczynski, Andrzej, 1996. "Exit and voice after mass privatization: The case of Russia," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 581-588, April.
    2. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    4. Alan Hughes & Ajit Singh, 1987. "Takeovers And The Stock Market," Contributions to Political Economy, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 6(1), pages 73-85.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    privatization; corporate governance; Russia.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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