A general model of oligopoly endogenizing Cournot, Bertrand, Stackelberg, and Allaz-Vila
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More about this item
Keywords
forward sales; capacity precommitment; Cournot; Stackelberg; Bertrand;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2010-01-23 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2010-01-23 (Industrial Competition)
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