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Entertaining Douglass North: Political Violence and Social Order

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  • Karim Khan

    (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad)

  • Sadia Sherbaz

    (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad)

Abstract

Violence creates chaos or uncertainty, destabilises social and political structure, deters investment, and retards economic prosperity. In order to curtail violence, the society needs a social order which comprises a set of formal and informal institutions. The social order is aimed at structuring economic, social and political interactions. In this study, we examine what such a set of institutions implies for the mitigation of violence. We take four indicators of political violence, i.e. civil wars, inter-state wars, ethnic violence, and terrorism. In addition, we aggregate civil wars, inter-state wars and ethnic violence in order to get major episodes of the political violence. We find that for ethnic violence, terrorism, and major episodes of political violence, informal institutions are more efficient in decreasing violence. Also, they enhance the efficacy of formal institutions in mitigating these types of violence. In case of civil wars and interstate wars, formal institutions are more effective; however, if the level of formalisation is not accompanied by commiserate informal support, then the formal institutions become ineffectual. Moreover, the results show that there is complementarity between formal and informal institutions in reducing violence; giving credence to the idea that without institutional reforms, violence cannot be prevented in modern societies.

Suggested Citation

  • Karim Khan & Sadia Sherbaz, 2020. "Entertaining Douglass North: Political Violence and Social Order," PIDE-Working Papers 2020:174, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:pid:wpaper:2020:174
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Violence; Social Order; Formal and Informal Institutions; Ethnic Violence; Civil Wars; Inter-State Wars; Terrorism; Major Episodes of Political Violence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H13 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Economics of Eminent Domain; Expropriation; Nationalization
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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