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The role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition

Author

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  • Alexander Haupt

    (University of Plymouth and CESifo)

  • Tim Krieger

    (University of Paderborn)

Abstract

In this paper, we analyse the role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition. Our primary result is that increasing ‘relocation’ mobility of firms leads to increasing ‘net’ tax revenues under fairly weak conditions. While enhanced relocation mobility intensifies tax competition, it weakens subsidy competition. The resulting fall in the governments’ subsidy payments overcompensates the decline in tax revenues, leading to a rise in net tax revenues. We derive this conclusion in a model in which two governments are first engaged in subsidy competition and thereafter in tax competition, and firms locate and potentially relocate in response to the two political choices.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Haupt & Tim Krieger, 2009. "The role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition," Working Papers CIE 21, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:pdn:ciepap:21
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Tim Krieger & Thomas Lange, 2010. "Education policy and tax competition with imperfect student and labor mobility," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(6), pages 587-606, December.
    2. Krieger, Tim & Meierrieks, Daniel, 2014. "How to deal with international terrorism," Discussion Paper Series 2014-03, University of Freiburg, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy.
    3. Langenmayr, Dominika Irma & Martin, Simmler, 2016. "Why the Current Tax Rate Tells You Little: Competing For Mobile and Immobile Firms," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145568, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Haupt, Alexander & Krieger, Tim & Lange, Thomas, 2013. "Education policy, student migration, and brain gain," Discussion Paper Series 2013-05, University of Freiburg, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax competition; subsidy competition; capital and firm mobility; foreign direct investment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies

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