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Job Design and the Benefits of Private Trade

Author

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  • Pablo Casas-Arce
  • Santhi Hejeebu
  • Cornell College

Abstract

We reconsider the job design theory of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), to include career concerns considerations. When reputations are considered, discretion may play a more integral part of the incentive scheme. It can be a useful instrument to enhance incentives and prevent the adverse selection of low ability agents. We then show that these synergies are useful in explaining the employment of U.S. faculty members and the employment of agents in the English East India Company, an historically important firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Casas-Arce & Santhi Hejeebu & Cornell College, 2004. "Job Design and the Benefits of Private Trade," Economics Series Working Papers 204, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:204
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    File URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:17099711-52ed-4851-9ae8-0f469d07b71e
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Meyer, Margaret A. & Olsen, Trond E. & Torsvik, Gaute, 1996. "Limited intertemporal commitment and job design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 401-417, December.
    2. Mathias Dewatripont & Ian Jewitt & Jean Tirole, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 199-217.
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    4. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 2000. "Multitask Learning and the Reorganization of Work: From Tayloristic to Holistic Organization," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 353-376, July.
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    6. Brickley, James A. & Zimmerman, Jerold L., 2001. "Changing incentives in a multitask environment: evidence from a top-tier business school," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 367-396, December.
    7. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-991, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Job Design; Multitasking; Career Concerns;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

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