IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/8105.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal - Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided

Author

Listed:
  • Dennis W. Carlton

Abstract

This paper analyzes the question: When should a single firm have a duty to deal with another? The paper uses a series of economic models to answer the question, assuming the goal is to prevent harm to competition, and applies the economic analysis to the leading cases to show when antitrust enforcement is appropriate and when it is not. The analysis shows that, to prevent harm to competition, the role for antitrust should be quite limited and that two leading cases, Aspen and Kodak, represent a dangerous direction for antitrust policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Dennis W. Carlton, 2001. "A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal - Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided," NBER Working Papers 8105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8105
    Note: IO
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w8105.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2008. "Safe Harbors for Quantity Discounts and Bundling," EAG Discussions Papers 200801, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    2. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, 2013. "Exclusive Dealing: Before Bork, and Beyond," Working Papers 2013-11, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    3. Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta, 2020. "Dynamic Vertical Foreclosure," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(4), pages 763-812.
    4. Ishikawa, Jota & Morita, Hodaka & Mukunoki, Hiroshi, 2020. "Parallel imports and repair services," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 137-160.
    5. David Spector, 2011. "Exclusive contracts and demand foreclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(4), pages 619-638, December.
    6. Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker, 2014. "Antitrust and Regulation," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?, pages 25-61, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Dennis W. Carlton, 2007. "Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(3), pages 155-176, Summer.
    8. Au, Man Ho, 2011. "Network neutrality: Hong Kong's perspectives," 8th ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, Taipei 2011: Convergence in the Digital Age 52338, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    9. Nadimi Soheil R. & Weisman Dennis L., 2020. "A Note on the Efficiency Gains from a Refusal to Deal in a Bertrand-Nash Framework," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(4), pages 1-12, October.
    10. Manne, Geoffrey & Wright, Joshua, 2011. "Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 1-19.
    11. Michael D. Whinston, 2001. "Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 63-80, Spring.
    12. David L. Kaserman, 2007. "Efficient Durable Good Pricing And Aftermarket Tie‐In Sales," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(3), pages 533-537, July.
    13. Yuk‐fai Fong & Jin Li & Ke Liu, 2016. "When Does Aftermarket Monopolization Soften Foremarket Competition?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 852-879, December.
    14. Robert Hahn & Robert Litan & Hal Singer, 2010. "Addressing the next wave of Internet regulation: Toward a workable principle for nondiscrimination," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 4(3), pages 365-382, September.
    15. Jerry Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, 2014. "Telecommunications Regulation: Current Approaches with the End in Sight," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?, pages 345-406, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, 2008. "Appropriate Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm Conduct," EAG Discussions Papers 200802, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    17. Michael Waldman, 2004. "Antitrust Perspectives for Durable-Goods Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 1306, CESifo.
    18. John Vickers, 2010. "Competition Policy and Property Rights," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(544), pages 375-392, May.
    19. Michael Waldman, 2003. "Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 131-154, Winter.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L - Industrial Organization

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8105. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.