Deposit Insurance and Depositor Monitoring: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from the Creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
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Cited by:
- Zhao, Jing & Gao, Yaqin & Zhao, Lijuan, 2024. "How does deposit insurance affect household's risk sensitivity?Evidence from China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(PB).
- Fecht, Falko & Thum, Stefan & Weber, Patrick, 2019.
"Fear, deposit insurance schemes, and deposit reallocation in the German banking system,"
Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 151-165.
- Fecht, Falko & Thum, Stefan & Weber, Patrick, 2019. "Fear, deposit insurance schemes, and deposit reallocation in the German banking system," Discussion Papers 12/2019, Deutsche Bundesbank.
- Haelim Anderson & Daniel Barth & Dong Beom Choi, 2018.
"Reducing moral hazard at the expense of market discipline: the effectiveness of double liability before and during the Great Depression,"
Staff Reports
869, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Haelim Anderson & Daniel Barth & Dong Beom Choi, 2018. "Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability Before and During the Great Depression," Working Papers 18-06, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
- Christoffer Koch & Gary Richardson & Patrick Van Horn, 2020. "Countercyclical Capital Buffers: A Cautionary Tale," NBER Working Papers 26710, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
- E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- N22 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
- P34 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Finance
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBA-2017-10-01 (Central Banking)
- NEP-HIS-2017-10-01 (Business, Economic and Financial History)
- NEP-IAS-2017-10-01 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2017-10-01 (Macroeconomics)
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