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Harvests' Lifespan and North-South Market Share Rivalry

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  • Hassan BENCHEKROUN
  • Saad BENCHEKROUN

Abstract

We consider a North-South duopolistic competition in the market of a perishable good. North's harvest can be sold over two periods whereas South's harvest can be sold in the first period only, because of the lack of storage technology. We examine the impact of the availability of a storage technology in South that would allow it to sell its harvest over two periods. We identify situations in which both North and South see their profits decrease and situations in which both North and South enjoy larger profits when the lifespan of South's harvest increases. Our findings can be useful to assess the support for policy interventions that aim at transferring better technologies to South. There are cases where North and South's industries will both push for (or both resist) the transfer of a technology to South that will lengthen the lifespan of its product.

Suggested Citation

  • Hassan BENCHEKROUN & Saad BENCHEKROUN, 2014. "Harvests' Lifespan and North-South Market Share Rivalry," Cahiers de recherche 12-2014, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:12-2014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    perishable goods; market share rivalry; dynamic oligopoly; storage;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q16 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - R&D; Agricultural Technology; Biofuels; Agricultural Extension Services
    • Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General

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