Induced Entry into the Social Security Disability Program: Using Past SGA Changes as a Natural Experiment
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Cited by:
- Yonatan Ben-Shalom & David Stapleton, "undated".
"Trends in the Composition and Outcomes of Young Social Security Disability Awardees,"
Mathematica Policy Research Reports
11a2e93ee9b1466baf2365854, Mathematica Policy Research.
- Yonatan Ben-Shalom & David Stapleton, 2013. "Trends in the Composition and Outcomes of Young Social Security Disability Awardees," Working Papers wp284, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center.
- repec:mpr:mprres:7847 is not listed on IDEAS
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