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Think locally, act locally: Can decentralized planning really achieve first-best in the presence of environmental spillovers?

Author

Listed:
  • Harrison Fell

    (Division of Economics and Business, Colorado School of Mines)

  • Daniel T. Kaffine

    (Division of Economics and Business, Colorado School of Mines)

Abstract

Strikingly, Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) find that in a model with heterogenous jurisdictions, interjurisdictional capital flows, and interjurisdictional environmental damage spillovers, decentralized planning outcomes are equivalent to that under a single centralized planner. Taken to its extreme this result renders international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol irrelevant. We first show the critical importance of two key assumptions (no retirement of capital, fixed environmental damages per unit of capital) in obtaining this result. Second, we consider a more general model allowing for capital retirement and abatement activities and show that generally the outcome of a decentralized market differs from the solution of a centralized planner's social welfare-maximizing problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Harrison Fell & Daniel T. Kaffine, 2013. "Think locally, act locally: Can decentralized planning really achieve first-best in the presence of environmental spillovers?," Working Papers 2013-07, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:mns:wpaper:wp201307
    as

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    File URL: http://econbus-papers.mines.edu/working-papers/wp201307.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Montgomery, W. David, 1972. "Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 395-418, December.
    2. Hikaru Ogawa & David E. Wildasin, 2009. "Think Locally, Act Locally: Spillovers, Spillbacks, and Efficient Decentralized Policymaking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1206-1217, September.
    3. Thomas Eichner & Marco Runkel, 2012. "Interjurisdictional Spillovers, Decentralized Policymaking, and the Elasticity of Capital Supply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 2349-2357, August.
    4. Oates, Wallace E. & Schwab, Robert M., 1988. "Economic competition among jurisdictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 333-354, April.
    5. Stern,Nicholas, 2007. "The Economics of Climate Change," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521700801, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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