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Custom

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  • Schlicht, Ekkehart

Abstract

A brief statement of the costumary foundations of economic processes and institutions and a review of theoretical approaches to custom.

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  • Schlicht, Ekkehart, 2001. "Custom," Discussion Papers in Economics 19, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:19
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Schlicht Ekkehart, 2000. "Aestheticism in the Theory of Custom," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-21, March.
    2. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    3. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1979. "The Transition to Labour Management as a Gestalt Switch," Munich Reprints in Economics 3388, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    4. David Romer, 1984. "The Theory of Social Custom: A Modification and Some Extensions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 99(4), pages 717-727.
    5. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard H, 1986. "Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages 285-300, October.
    6. Kuran, Timur, 1987. "Preference Falsification, Policy Continuity and Collective Conservatism," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 642-665, September.
    7. Wittman, Donald, 1982. "Efficient Rules in Highway Safety and Sports Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 78-90, March.
    8. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    9. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics and Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753.
    10. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    11. George A. Akerlof, 1980. "A Theory of Social Custom, of which Unemployment may be One Consequence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 94(4), pages 749-775.
    12. Arthur, W Brian, 1989. "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(394), pages 116-131, March.
    13. Iannaccone, Laurence R, 1992. "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(2), pages 271-291, April.
    14. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1998. "On Custom in the Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198292241.
    15. Heiner, Ronald A, 1983. "The Origin of Predictable Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 560-595, September.
    16. Eggertsson,Thrainn, 1990. "Economic Behavior and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521348911, September.
    17. repec:bla:kyklos:v:32:y:1979:i:4:p:775-801 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Rivera-Camino, Jaime, 2012. "Corporate environmental market responsiveness: A model of individual and organizational drivers," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 402-411.

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