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Vagueness of Language: Indeterminacy under Two-Dimensional State Uncertainty

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  • Saori CHIBA

Abstract

We study indeterminacy of indicative meanings (disagreements about meanings of messages among players), a kind of language vagueness examined in Blume and Board (2013). They, using a cheap talk model in which the state distribution and the players’ language competence were ex-ante uncertain, demonstrated that this vagueness occurs as the equilibrium language. We expand the work of Blume and Board by using a model between an uninformed decision maker and an informed agent in which the state-distribution and the state are both exante uncertain. We show that this two-dimensional uncertainty also leads to indeterminacy of indicative meanings, that is, to a set of conditions in which an agent with different perceptions of state-distribution intentionally uses the same symbol for the different extents of information on the state. Our vagueness can lead to welfare improvement.

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  • Saori CHIBA, 2018. "Vagueness of Language: Indeterminacy under Two-Dimensional State Uncertainty," Discussion papers e-18-003, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
    • Handle: RePEc:kue:epaper:e-18-003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yeon-Koo Che & Navin Kartik, 2009. "Opinions as Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(5), pages 815-860, October.
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    5. Saori Chiba, 2014. "Extensions and Vagueness of Language under Two-Dimensional State Uncertainty," Working Papers 20, Venice School of Management - Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information. Language. State-Uncertainty. Vagueness.;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility

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