Behavioral Aspects of Communication in Organizations
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- Fortuna Casoria & Arno Riedl & Peter Werner, 2020. "Behavioral Aspects of Communication in Organizations," CESifo Working Paper Series 8140, CESifo.
- Casoria, Fortuna & Riedl, Arno & Werner, Peter, 2020. "Behavioral aspects of communication in organizations," Research Memorandum 010, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Fortuna Casoria & Arno Riedl & Peter Werner, 2020. "Behavioral Aspects of Communication in Organizations," Post-Print halshs-03024050, HAL.
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- Petra Nieken & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2023.
"Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities: an experimental study,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(5), pages 989-1021, November.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Nieken, Petra, 2020. "Contracting under Asymmetric Information and Externalities: An Experimental Study," CEPR Discussion Papers 15492, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Werner, Peter, 2023.
"Wage negotiations and strategic responses to transparency,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 161-175.
- Werner, Peter, 2019. "Wage negotiations and strategic responses to transparency," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203567, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Klaus Abbink & Lu Dong & Lingbo Huang, 2022. "Talking Behind Your Back: Communication and Team Cooperation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5187-5200, July.
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More about this item
Keywords
communication; organization; experiment; behavior;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EXP-2020-04-13 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2020-04-13 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2020-04-13 (Labour Economics)
Statistics
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