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Monetary Policy and Central Banking after the Crisis: The Implications of Rethinking Macroeconomic Theory

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  • Thomas I. Palley

Abstract

The financial crisis and Great Recession have prompted a rethink of monetary policy and central banking. The status quo insider rethink focuses on the role of monetary policy in dealing with asset bubbles; making the central bank the banking system supervisor; and how to deal with the problem of the zero lower bound to nominal interest rates. This paper presents an outsider reform program that focuses on central bank governance and independence; reshaping the economic philosophy of central banks to be more intellectually open-minded; major monetary policy reform that includes adoption of an inflation target equal to the minimum unemployment rate of inflation (MURI) and implementation of asset based reserve requirements; and regulatory reform that addresses problems of flawed incentives, excessive leverage, and maturity mismatch.The proposed outsider reform program is rooted in a rethink of macroeconomic theory compelled by the crisis. There are some overlaps between the insider and outsider reform programs but they are more form than substance. That is dangerous because it can confuse debate if similarity of form is mistaken for similarity of substance.The insider program makes no changes to macroeconomic theory and is uncritical of the Federal Reserve's past actions. From its perspective, any failings of the Federal Reserve have been unwitting sins of omission. The outsider program fundamentally challenges existing macroeconomic theory and is also highly critical of the Federal Reserve. From its perspective the failings of the Federal Reserve have included significant sins of commission rooted in political capture, cognitive capture and intellectual hubris.The outsider critique can be taken even further. The Federal Reserve is already legally mandated to pursue maximum employment with price stability. However, it needs institutional transformation that makes it think of itself as an agent for helping realize the "American Dream". That means it should have a duty to shape the allocation of credit and the financial system in ways that ensure growth, full employment and a fair shake for all.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas I. Palley, 2011. "Monetary Policy and Central Banking after the Crisis: The Implications of Rethinking Macroeconomic Theory," IMK Working Paper 8-2011, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:imk:wpaper:8-2011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mishkin, F S., 2008. "How should we respond to asset price bubbles?," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 12, pages 65-74, October.
    2. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    3. Marvin Goodfriend, 2007. "How the World Achieved Consensus on Monetary Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(4), pages 47-68, Fall.
    4. Olivier Blanchard, 2009. "The State of Macro," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 209-228, May.
    5. Hyman P. Minsky, 1992. "The Financial Instability Hypothesis," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_74, Levy Economics Institute.
    6. Olivier Blanchard & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Paolo Mauro, 2010. "Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(s1), pages 199-215, September.
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    1. [A&C] Monetary Policy and Central Banking after the Crisis: The Implications of Rethinking Macroeconomic Theory
      by Lorenzo Battisti in Pensieri Economici on 2013-05-29 16:03:00

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    Cited by:

    1. Dongkoo Chang & Vincent Choon-Seng Lim & Eufrocinio M. Bernabe, Jr., 2014. "Alternative Monetary Policy Frameworks for Price and Financial Stability," Working Papers wp06, South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Research and Training Centre.
    2. Gerald Epstein, 2013. "Developmental central banking: winning the future by updating a page from the past," Review of Keynesian Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing, vol. 1(3), pages 273-287, January.
    3. Amelia Correa & Romar Correa, 2016. "Asset-based reserve requirements," International Journal of Pluralism and Economics Education, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 7(1), pages 39-44.

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