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Toward a Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Lessons From Corporate Bankruptcy Practice Around the World

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  • Mr. Patrick Bolton

Abstract

This paper provides an overview of key elements of Corporate Bankruptcy Codes and Practice around the world that are relevant to the debate on Sovereign Debt Restructuring. It highlights four components common to most bankruptcy reorganization institutions: a stay on debt collection efforts to prevent a costly run for the assets, broad enforcement of absolute priority, majority voting among creditors on the proposed reorganization plan, and new higher priority financing to keep the firm going while its liabilities are restructured. The paper argues that these components ought to be present in any sovereign debt restructuring procedure.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. Patrick Bolton, 2003. "Toward a Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Lessons From Corporate Bankruptcy Practice Around the World," IMF Working Papers 2003/013, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2003/013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Leszek Balcerowicz, 2010. "Sovereign Bankruptcy in the European Union in the Comparative Perspective," Working Paper Series WP10-18, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    2. Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, 2009. "Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of Seniority -super-1," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(3), pages 879-902.
    3. Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, 2005. "Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of Seniority," NBER Working Papers 11071, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Marc Flandreau, 2013. "Sovereign states, bondholders committees, and the London Stock Exchange in the nineteenth century (1827–68): new facts and old fictions," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 29(4), pages 668-696, WINTER.
    5. Alistair K. L. Milne, 2011. "Limited Liability Government Debt for the Eurozone -super-†," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 57(1), pages 44-78, March.
    6. Julian Schumacher & Christoph Trebesch & Henrik Enderlein, 2015. "What Explains Sovereign Debt Litigation?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3).
    7. Xavier Vives, 2006. "Banking and Regulation in Emerging Markets: The Role of External Discipline," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 21(2), pages 179-206.
    8. Alonso José Antonio, 2018. "Two Major Gaps in Global Governance: International Tax Cooperation and Sovereign Debt Crisis Resolution," Journal of Globalization and Development, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2), pages 1-17, December.

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