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Conditionality as an Instrument of Borrower Credibility

Author

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  • Mr. Pierre Dhonte

Abstract

Fund member countries that adopt market-friendly policies often encounter a credibility problem—market-friendly policies are not effective in stimulating private investment as long as there remains a significant risk of policy reversal. The root of this risk lies in the discretionary policy-making authority of governments. Committing to a program with the Fund, and endorsing its conditionality, is one instrument available to governments to overcome this difficulty. The paper develops this interpretation of conditionality and indicates some of its operational implications for Fund programs.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. Pierre Dhonte, 1997. "Conditionality as an Instrument of Borrower Credibility," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 1997/002, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfpdp:1997/002
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Graham Bird, 2007. "The Imf: A Bird'S Eye View Of Its Role And Operations," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 683-745, September.
    2. Boockmann, Bernhard & Dreher, Axel, 2003. "The contribution of the IMF and the World Bank to economic freedom," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 633-649, September.
    3. Bird, Graham, 2002. "The credibility and signalling effect of IMF programmes," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 24(9), pages 799-811, December.
    4. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/6881 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Dreher, Axel, 2002. "The Development and Implementation of IMF and World Bank Conditionality," Discussion Paper Series 26352, Hamburg Institute of International Economics.
    6. Hippolyte Balima & Amadou Sy, 2021. "IMF-Supported Programs and Sovereign Debt Crises," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 69(2), pages 427-465, June.
    7. Catherine Haguenau-Moizard & Thierry Montalieu, 2004. "L’évolution du partenariat UE-ACP de Lomé à Cotonou : de l’exception a la normalisation," Mondes en développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 128(4), pages 65-88.
    8. Molly Bauer & Cesi Cruz & Benjamin Graham, 2012. "Democracies only: When do IMF agreements serve as a seal of approval?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 33-58, March.
    9. Graham Bird & Dane Rowlands, 2000. "The catalyzing role of policy-based lending by the IMF and the World Bank: fact or fiction?," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(7), pages 951-973.
    10. Mr. Jun I Kim, 2006. "IMF-Supported Programs and Crisis Prevention: An Analytical Framework," IMF Working Papers 2006/156, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Prince Eyi-Mensah, 2016. "Does Conditionality on Borrowing Help?," International Business Research, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 9(7), pages 12-23, July.
    12. Devesh KAPUR & Richard WEBB, 2000. "Governance-Related Conditionalities Of The International Financial Institutions," G-24 Discussion Papers 6, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
    13. Ved P. Nanda, 2006. "The “Good Governance†Concept Revisited," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 603(1), pages 269-283, January.
    14. Bird, Graham, 2001. "IMF Programs: Do They Work? Can They be Made to Work Better?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(11), pages 1849-1865, November.
    15. Axel Dreher, 2009. "IMF conditionality: theory and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 233-267, October.
    16. Drazen, Allan, 2002. "Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 3562, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Jérôme Sgard, 2004. "IMF in Theory: Sovereign Debts, Judicialisation and Multilateralism," Working Papers hal-01065546, HAL.
    18. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6881 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Thierry Montalieu & Catherine Haguenau-Moizard, 2004. "L'évolution du partenariat UE-ACP de Lomé à Cotonou : de l'exception à la normalisation," Post-Print halshs-00007792, HAL.
    20. Hippolyte W. Balima & Mr. Amadou N Sy, 2019. "The Impact of Bailouts on the Probability of Sovereign Debt Crises: Evidence from IMF-Supported Programs," IMF Working Papers 2019/002, International Monetary Fund.
    21. Martin S. Edwards, 2005. "Investor Responses to IMF Program Suspensions: Is Noncompliance Costly?," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 86(4), pages 857-873, December.
    22. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6881 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner & Mauro F. Guillen, 2004. "International Coercion, Emulation and Policy Diffusion: Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reforms, 1977-1999," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-713, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    24. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6881 is not listed on IDEAS
    25. Marijana Andrijic & Tajana Barbic, 2018. "Trick or Treat? The Effect of IMF Programmes on Mobilising FDI in CESEE Countries," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 68(3), pages 245-267, July.

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