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Subastando la Energía para Clientes Regulados: Un Análisis de Equilibrio

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La reciente liberalización del mercado de generación eléctrica para clientes regulados autoriza a las empresas distribuidoras a contratar energía a precios que pueden ser superiores al precio nudo fijado por el regulador, traspasándolos íntegramente a sus consumidores. Motivado en esta reforma legal, este artículo analiza el equilibrio que resulta de una subasta hipotética en que una empresa distribuidora contrataría su energía. El modelo supone dos empresas generadoras, una hidráulica y otra térmica, ambas aversas al riesgo, que compiten ofertando precio por la energía subastada de un único distribuidor, vendiendo o comprando en el mercado spot sus diferencias de producción. Se supone además que generación hidráulica es estocástica, mientras que por simpleza se supone que la generación térmica es segura. Se demuestra que si la subasta es competitiva, ésta se adjudica a la generadora que fija el precio del mercado spot del sistema cuando hay sequía. Así, la empresa térmica es la que margina cuando la sequía es moderada, ofertando un precio mayor que el precio nudo o promedio del costo marginal esperado del sistema. Por otro lado, si la sequía es extrema al punto de generar desabastecimiento, entonces será la firma hidráulica la que ofrecerá el menor precio en la subasta. Los resultados son robustos a suponer si la sequía extrema es o no fuerza mayor (artículo 99 bis de la Ley Eléctrica). Por último, se encuentra que si ambas generadoras fueran neutrales al riesgo ofrecerían el mismo precio en la subasta e igual al precio nudo regulado, haya o no riesgo de desabastecimiento en períodos secos.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco Caravia & Eduardo Saavedra, 2005. "Subastando la Energía para Clientes Regulados: Un Análisis de Equilibrio," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv169, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
  • Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv169
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Subasta; Energía; Abastecimiento incierto; Racionamiento Eléctrico;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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