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Determinants of high-royalty contracts and the impact of stronger protection of intellectual property rights in Japan

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  • Sadao Nagaoka

Abstract

This paper first reviews how Japan has strengthened the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs), focusing on the expansion of the patentable subject matter, the restriction of the possibility of compulsory licensing, stronger deterrence against infringement and the introduction of the doctrine of equivalents. Second, based on the statistical analysis of sector-level panel data, it shows that (1)R&D intensity of domestic industry, trademark licensing, cross-licensing and, to a smaller degree, monopoly provisions are the significant determinants of the incidence of high-royalty contracts, and (2)Stronger protection of intellectual property rights looks to have increased the incidence of high-royalty contracts in the latter part of 1990s in the Japanese industries for which patent is important for appropriability.

Suggested Citation

  • Sadao Nagaoka, 2004. "Determinants of high-royalty contracts and the impact of stronger protection of intellectual property rights in Japan," Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series d04-60, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  • Handle: RePEc:hst:hstdps:d04-60
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mark Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer, 1999. "Damages and Injunctions in the Protection of Proprietary Research Tools," NBER Working Papers 7086, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    5. repec:bla:jindec:v:48:y:2000:i:1:p:103-35 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Keith E. Maskus, 2000. "Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 99, April.
    7. Caves, Richard E & Crookell, Harold & Killing, J Peter, 1983. "The Imperfect Market for Technology Licenses," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 45(3), pages 249-267, August.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tsutomu Shibata, 2006. "Japan, Moving Toward a More Advanced Knowledge Economy : Volume 1. Assessment and Lessons," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 7081.
    2. Kyoji Fukao & Victoria Kravtsova & Kentaro Nakajima, 2014. "How important is geographical agglomeration to factory efficiency in Japan’s manufacturing sector?," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 52(3), pages 659-696, May.
    3. Yu-Shan Chen & Ke-Chiun Chang, 2009. "Using neural network to analyze the influence of the patent performance upon the market value of the US pharmaceutical companies," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 80(3), pages 637-655, September.
    4. Kuang-Cheng Andy Wang & Dang-Long Bui & Yi-Jie Wang & Wen-Jung Liang, 2023. "International licensing under an endogenous tariff in vertically-related markets," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 139(2), pages 93-123, July.
    5. Sadao Nagaoka, 2009. "Does strong patent protection facilitate international technology transfer? Some evidence from licensing contracts of Japanese firms," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 128-144, April.
    6. Andrea Pierce & Debapriya Sen, 2014. "Outsourcing versus technology transfer: Hotelling meets Stackelberg," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 111(3), pages 263-287, April.
    7. Sen, Debapriya & Stamatopoulos, Giorgos, 2009. "Drastic innovations and multiplicity of optimal licensing policies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 7-10, October.
    8. Sudipto Bhattacharya & Claude d’Aspremont & Sergei Guriev & Debapriya Sen & Yair Tauman, 2014. "Cooperation in R&D: Patenting, Licensing, and Contracting," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Kalyan Chatterjee & William Samuelson (ed.), Game Theory and Business Applications, edition 2, chapter 0, pages 265-286, Springer.
    9. Yu-Shan Chen & Ke-Chiun Chang, 2010. "The nonlinear nature of the relationships between the patent traits and corporate performance," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 82(1), pages 201-210, January.
    10. Kuang-Cheng Andy Wang & Yi-Jie Wang & Wen-Jung Liang, 2016. "Intellectual property rights, international licensing and foreign direct investment," Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(3), pages 291-305, July.
    11. Dang, Jianwei & Motohashi, Kazuyuki & Huo, Dong, 2022. "Get Pennies from many or get a Dollar from one? Multiple licensing in markets for technology," Technovation, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    12. Yu-Shan Chen & Chun-Yu Shih & Ching-Hsun Chang, 2014. "Explore the new relationship between patents and market value: a panel smooth transition regression (PSTR) approach," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 98(2), pages 1145-1159, February.
    13. Debapriya Sen & Giorgos Stamatopoulos, 2009. "Technology Transfer Under Returns To Scale," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(3), pages 337-365, June.
    14. Kabiraj, Abhishek & Kabiraj, Tarun, 2017. "Tariff induced licensing contracts, consumers’ surplus and welfare," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 439-447.
    15. Arora, Ashish & Gambardella, Alfonso, 2010. "The Market for Technology," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 641-678, Elsevier.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Intellectual property rights; Licensing contract; Appropriability; Patent;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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