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Vacancy Referrals, Job Search, and the Duration of Unemployment: A Randomized Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Engström, Per

    (Department of Economics)

  • Hesselius, Patrik

    (IFAU)

  • Holmlund, Bertil

    (Department of Economics)

Abstract

One goal of the public employment service is to facilitate matching between unemployed job seekers and job vacancies; another goal is to monitor job search so as to bring search efforts among the unemployed in line with search requirements. The referral of job seekers to vacancies is one instrument used for these purposes. We report results from a randomized Swedish experiment where the outcome of referrals is examined. To what extent do unemployed individuals actually apply for the jobs they are referred to? Does information to job seekers about increased monitoring affect the probability of applying and the probability of leaving unemployment? The experiment indicates that a relatively large fraction (one third) of the referrals do not result in job applications. Information about intensified monitoring causes an increase in the probability of job application, especially among young people. However, we find no significant impact on the duration of unemployment.

Suggested Citation

  • Engström, Per & Hesselius, Patrik & Holmlund, Bertil, 2009. "Vacancy Referrals, Job Search, and the Duration of Unemployment: A Randomized Experiment," Working Paper Series 2009:1, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2009_001
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hägglund, Pathric, 2006. "Are there pre-programme effects of Swedish active labour market policies? Evidence from three randomised experiments," Working Paper Series 2006:2, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    2. Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2006. "Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 357-386, July.
    3. Ashenfelter, Orley & Ashmore, David & Deschenes, Olivier, 2005. "Do unemployment insurance recipients actively seek work? Evidence from randomized trials in four U.S. States," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 125(1-2), pages 53-75.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joost Bollens & Bart Cockx, 2017. "Effectiveness of a job vacancy referral scheme," IZA Journal of Labor Policy, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 6(1), pages 1-24, December.
    2. Gerard J Van Den Berg & Barbara Hofmann & Arne Uhlendorff, 2016. "The Role of Sickness in the Evaluation of Job Search Assistance and Sanctions," Working Papers 2016-17, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    3. Cheung, Maria & Egebark, Johan & Forslund, Anders & Laun, Lisa & Rödin, Magnus & Vikström, Johan, 2019. "Does job search assistance reduce unemployment? Experimental evidence on displacement effects and mechanisms," Working Paper Series 2019:25, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    4. Marco Caliendo & Ricarda Schmidl, 2016. "Youth unemployment and active labor market policies in Europe," IZA Journal of Labor Policy, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 5(1), pages 1-30, December.
    5. Schmidl, Ricarda, 2015. "The Effectiveness of Early Vacancy Information in the Presence of Monitoring and ALMP," IZA Discussion Papers 9575, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Eva Van Belle & Ralf Caers & Marijke De Couck & Valentina Di Stasio & Stijn Baert, 2019. "The Signal of Applying for a Job Under a Vacancy Referral Scheme," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 251-274, April.
    7. Bart COCKX & Corinna GHIRELLI & Bruno VAN DER LINDEN, 2013. "Monitoring Job Search Effort with Hyperbolic Time Preferences and Non-Compliance: A Welfare Analysis," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2013006, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    8. Jonas Maibom & Michael Rosholm & Michael Svarer, 2017. "Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Early Meetings and Activation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(3), pages 541-570, July.
    9. Gerard J. van den Berg & Hanno Foerster & Arne Uhlendorff, 2021. "A Structural Analysis of Vacancy Referrals with Imperfect Monitoring and the Strategic Use of Sickness Absence," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1042, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 17 Sep 2023.
    10. Marios Michaelides & Peter Mueser & Jeffrey Smith, 2019. "Youth Unemployment and U.S. Job Search Assistance Policy during the Great Recession," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 13-2019, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    11. Morescalchi Andrea & Paruolo Paolo, 2020. "Too Much Stick for the Carrot? Job Search Requirements and Search Behaviour of Unemployment Benefit Claimants," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-21, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    vacancy referral; job matching; job search; randomized experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C99 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Other
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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