Admissibility and common belief
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- Asheim, Geir B. & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Admissibility and common belief," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 208-234, February.
- Asheim, Geir B. & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2000. "Amissibility and Common Belief," Research Papers in Economics 2000:6, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
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JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EVO-2000-08-26 (Evolutionary Economics)
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