Promising the right prize
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- Emeric Henry, 2010. "Promising the right prize," Sciences Po publications 7758, Sciences Po.
- Emeric Henry, 2010. "Promising the right prize," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-00972957, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Mitchell, Matthew & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2012.
"Shared Rights and Technological Progress,"
MPRA Paper
36537, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Yuzhe Zhang & Matthew Mitchell, 2013. "Shared Rights and Technological Progress," 2013 Meeting Papers 678, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Matthew Mitchell & Yuzhe Zhang, 2015. "Shared Patent Rights And Technological Progress," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 56(1), pages 95-132, February.
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More about this item
Keywords
innovation race; market commitment mechanism; mechanism design; prizes and sorting;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
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