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Cultural values and behavior in dictator, ultimatum, trust games: an experimental study

Author

Listed:
  • Sun-Ki Chai

    (Department of Sociology, University of Hawai‘i at Manoa)

  • Dolgosuren Dorj

    (Department of Economics, University of Hawai‘i at Manoa)

  • Katerina Sherstyuk

    (Department of Economics, University of Hawai‘i at Manoa)

Abstract

We explain laboratory behavior in the dictator, ultimatum and trust games based on two cultural dimensions adopted from social and cultural anthropology: grid and group, which translate into reciprocity and altruism, respectively, in such games. Altruism and reciprocity characteristics are measured for each individual using selected items from the World Values Survey. We find that altruism and reciprocity attributes systematically affect behavior. Subjects with higher altruism scores offer more, accept lower offers and return more. Subjects with higher reciprocity scores are more willing to punish violators of norms by rejecting offers more often, dividing fewer dollars and returning fewer dollars in the ultimatum and trust games.

Suggested Citation

  • Sun-Ki Chai & Dolgosuren Dorj & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2011. "Cultural values and behavior in dictator, ultimatum, trust games: an experimental study," Working Papers 201106, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hai:wpaper:201106
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    File URL: http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_11-6.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Marion Payen & Patrick Rondé, 2020. "Culture, Institutions and Economic Growth," Working Papers of BETA 2020-18, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    laboratory experiment; two-person game; survey; culture;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics

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