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Central bank institutional structure and effective central banking: cross-country empirical evidence

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  • Iftekhar Hasan
  • Loretta J. Mester

Abstract

Over the last decade, the legal and institutional frameworks governing central banks and financial market regulatory authorities throughout the world have undergone significant changes. This has created new interest in better understanding the roles played by organizational structures, accountability, and transparency, in increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of central banks in achieving their objectives and ultimately yielding better economic outcomes. Although much has been written pointing out the potential role institutional form can play in central bank performance, little empirical work has been done to investigate the hypothesis that institution form is related to performance. This paper attempts to help fill this void.

Suggested Citation

  • Iftekhar Hasan & Loretta J. Mester, 2008. "Central bank institutional structure and effective central banking: cross-country empirical evidence," Working Papers 08-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:08-5
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    Cited by:

    1. Ferrara, Federico M. & Masciandaro, Donato & Moschella, Manuela & Romelli, Davide, 2022. "Political voice on monetary policy: Evidence from the parliamentary hearings of the European Central Bank," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    2. Etienne Farvaque & Piotr Stanek & Stéphane Vigeant, 2014. "On the Performance of Monetary Policy Committees," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 177-203, May.
    3. Nicolò Fraccaroli & Alessandro Giovannini & Jean-François Jamet & Eric Persson, 2023. "Central Banks in Parliaments: A Text Analysis of the Parliamentary Hearings of the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, and the Federal Reserve," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 19(2), pages 543-600, June.
    4. Grégory Levieuge, 2018. "La politique monétaire doit-elle être utilisée à des fins de stabilité financière ?," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(3), pages 63-104.
    5. Vasco J. Gabriel & Ioannis Lazopoulos & Diana Lima, 2023. "Institutional Arrangements and Inflation Bias: A Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Approach," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(1), pages 43-76, February.
    6. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Levieuge, G. & Lucotte, Y. & Pradines-Jobet, F., 2019. "Central banks’ preferences and banking sector vulnerability," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 110-131.
    8. Yiwei Fang & Iftekhar Hasan & Loretta J. Mester, 2011. "Institutional Structure and Effectiveness of Central Banks during the Financial Crisis: An Empirical Analysis," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Farvaque Etienne & Stanek Piotr & Hammadou Hakim, 2011. "Selecting Your Inflation Targeters: Background and Performance of Monetary Policy Committee Members," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 12(2), pages 223-238, May.
    10. Michael Koetter & Kasper Roszbach & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2014. "Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 10(4), pages 31-68, December.
    11. D. Masciandaro, 2019. "What Bird Is That? Central Banking And Monetary Policy In The Last Forty Years," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19127, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    12. Rajeev Goel & Iftekhar Hasan, 2011. "Economy-wide corruption and bad loans in banking: international evidence," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(7), pages 455-461.
    13. Fraccaroli, Nicolò, 2019. "Supervisory governance, capture and non‑performing loans," Bank of England working papers 820, Bank of England.
    14. Federico M. Ferrara & Donato Masciandaro & Manuela Moschella & Davide Romelli, 2021. "Political Voice on Monetary Policy: Evidence from the Parliamentary Hearings of the European Central Bank," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21159, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    15. Lyonnet, Victor & Werner, Richard, 2012. "Lessons from the Bank of England on ‘quantitative easing’ and other ‘unconventional’ monetary policies," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 94-105.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banks and banking; Central;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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