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Environmentalists' Behaviour and Environmental Policies policies

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  • Joan Canton

    (University of Ottawa)

Abstract

In this partial equilibrium and static model, the impact of environmentalism on two countries' environmental policies is presented. First, the only (indirect) way environmentalists influence the choice of pollution taxes is through a negative term in the welfare function in Home. It is defined as passive environmentalism (PE). Second, this article is a first attempt to consider domestic environmentalists lobbying a foreign government. It is defined as active environmentalism (AE). Our contribution is threefold. We emphasize first that the way environmentalists act is paramount to study the consequences of their actions. Passive or active environmentalisms have very different impacts on environmental policies. Second, we show that lobbying activities can be counter-productive for environmentalists. Third, we characterize cases in which the presence of environmentalists has a non-ambiguous positive impact on welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Joan Canton, 2009. "Environmentalists' Behaviour and Environmental Policies policies," Working Papers 2009.76, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2009.76
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Masakazu Maezuru, 2012. "International Environmental Policies and Environmental Lobbying in the Presence of Eco-industry," ERSA conference papers ersa12p700, European Regional Science Association.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmentalism; Lobby Groups; Positive Environmental Economics; Strategic Environmental Policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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