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Quantity-before-Price Auction: Evaluating the Performance of the Brazilian Existing Energy Market

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  • Rodrigo Moita
  • Leonardo Rezende

Abstract

In this paper we study the outcome of the six rst \existing energy" auctions in Brazil. Under the current regulatory regime, the bulk of the trade between existing generators and distribution companies is done through bilateral eight-year contracts, negotiated in auctions organized by the regulatory agency. These so-called existing energy auctions follow a speci c rule that we call quantity-before-price auction. In this paper we develop an auction model to study this type of game and take the model to the data. The structural model enables us to estimate the opportunity cost of selling energy for each generator, which is the price they expect to obtain in the free market in the future. We nd that, while auction prices have steadily risen, the opportunity cost has increased even faster over time, indicating that the generators anticipate a faster increase in energy prices than what is measured by auction prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Rodrigo Moita & Leonardo Rezende, 2010. "Quantity-before-Price Auction: Evaluating the Performance of the Brazilian Existing Energy Market," Working Papers 08-2010, Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto.
  • Handle: RePEc:fea:wpaper:08-2010
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Emmanuel Guerre & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2000. "Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 525-574, May.
    2. Elodie Guerre & I. Perrigne & Q.H. Vuong, 2000. "Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions [[Estimation nonparamétrique optimale des enchères au premier prix]]," Post-Print hal-02697497, HAL.
    3. Moita, Rodrigo M. S., 2006. "Entry and Externality: Hydroelectric Generators in Brazil," Insper Working Papers wpe_61, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
    4. Klemperer, Paul, 1998. "Auctions with almost common values: The 'Wallet Game' and its applications," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 757-769, May.
    5. Dutra, Joisa & Menezes, Flavio, 2005. "Lessons from the Electricity Auctions in Brazil," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 18(10), pages 11-21, December.
    6. Lock, Reinier, 2005. "The New Electricity Model in Brazil: An Institutional Framework in Transition," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 52-61.
    7. Guerre, E. & Perrigne, I. & Vuong, Q., 1995. "Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Papers 9504, Southern California - Department of Economics.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Electricity; Brazil;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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