Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition
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- Catherine C. de Fontenay & Joshua S. Gans, 2005. "Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(3), pages 544-572, Autumn.
- Catherine C. de Fontenay & Joshua S. Gans, 2004. "Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 904, The University of Melbourne.
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More about this item
Keywords
vertical integration; foreclosure;JEL classification:
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2004-12-02 (Industrial Competition)
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