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Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations

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  • Weese, Eric

    (Yale University)

Abstract

Due to moral hazard problems, municipal mergers in Japan did not result in as many amalgamations as a central planner would have chosen. The inefficiency of the decentralized mergers is calculated using structural parameter estimates based on observed mergers and actual national government policies. Estimation requires neither an equilibrium selection assumption nor the enumeration of all possible mergers.

Suggested Citation

  • Weese, Eric, 2013. "Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations," Working Papers 113, Yale University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:yaleco:113
    as

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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