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Worker Asymmetric Information and Involuntary Unemployment

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  • Russell Cooper

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  • Russell Cooper, 1983. "Worker Asymmetric Information and Involuntary Unemployment," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 671R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 1984.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:671r
    Note: CFP 614.
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    File URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d06/d0671-r.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Masanori Hashimoto & Ben T. Yu, 1980. "Specific Capital, Employmemt Contracts, and Wage Rigidity," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 536-549, Autumn.
    2. Hall, Robert E & Lilien, David M, 1979. "Efficient Wage Bargains under Uncertain Supply and Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 868-879, December.
    3. Harris Milton & Townsend, Robert M, 1981. "Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 33-64, January.
    4. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-359, March.
    5. Hall, Robert E & Lazear, Edward P, 1984. "The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(2), pages 233-257, April.
    6. Lorne Carmichael, 1983. "Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 251-258, Spring.
    7. John Moore, 1985. "Optimal Labour Contracts when Workers have a Variety of Privately Observed Reservation Wages," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(1), pages 37-67.
    8. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
    9. V.V. Chari, 1980. "Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts," Discussion Papers 459, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
    11. Kahn, Charles M, 1985. "Optimal Severance Pay with Incomplete Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 435-451, June.
    12. Green, Jerry & Honkapohja, Seppo, 1983. "Bilateral contracts," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 171-187, April.
    13. Cooper, Russell, 1983. "A note on overemployment/underemployment in labor contracts under asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 81-87.
    14. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(1), pages 3-35.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1984. "Theories of Wage Rigidity," NBER Working Papers 1442, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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