Empirical Models of Auctions
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Note: CFP 1229.
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- Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006. "Empirical Models of Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001045, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006. "Empirical Models of Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12126, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
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122247000000000524, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Susan Athey, 2005. "Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000098, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Jonathan Levin & Susan Athey & Enrique Seira, 2004. "Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions," Working Papers 2004.142, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 1-51, February.
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More about this item
Keywords
Auctions; Identification; Estimation; Testing;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C5 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ECM-2006-03-25 (Econometrics)
Statistics
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