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Wholesale Markets in Telecommunications

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  • Pouyet, Jérôme
  • Hombert, Johan
  • Schutz, Nicolas

Abstract

In telecommunications some operators have deployed their own networks whereas some others have not. The latter firms must purchase wholesale products from the former to be able to compete on the final market. We show that, even when network operators compete in prices and offer perfectly homogenous products on the wholesale market, that market may not be competitive. Based on our theoretical analysis, we derive some policy implications for the broadband and the mobile telephony markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Pouyet, Jérôme & Hombert, Johan & Schutz, Nicolas, 2007. "Wholesale Markets in Telecommunications," CEPR Discussion Papers 6224, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6224
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    Cited by:

    1. Corrocher, Nicoletta & Lasio, Laura, 2013. "Diversification strategies in network-based services: The case of mobile virtual network operators," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 1110-1123.
    2. Michiel Bijlsma & Gijsbert Zwart, 2009. "Competition for access; spectrum rights and downstream access in wireless telecommunications," CPB Discussion Paper 123.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    3. Michiel Bijlsma & Viktoria Kocsis & Nelli Valmari, 2008. "Competition and access price regulation in the broadband market," CPB Discussion Paper 106, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    4. Michiel Bijlsma & Viktoria Kocsis & Victoria Shestalova & Gijsbert Zwart, 2008. "Vertical foreclosure: a policy framework," CPB Document 157, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    5. Pouyet, Jérôme & Hombert, Johan & Schutz, Nicolas, 2007. "Wholesale Markets in Telecommunications," CEPR Discussion Papers 6224, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Michiel Bijlsma & Viktoria Kocsis & Nelli Valmari, 2008. "Competition and access price regulation in the broadband market," CPB Discussion Paper 106.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    7. Höffler, Felix & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2008. "Two tales on resale," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1448-1460, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Telecommunications; Upstream and downstream markets; Vertical integration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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